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Can children withhold consent to treatment?
J A Devereux, D P H Jones, D L Dickenson
A dilemma exists when a doctor is faced with a child
or young person who refuses medically indicated
treatment. The Gillick case had been interpreted by
many tomean that a child ofsufficient age and intelli-
gence could validly consent or refuse consent to
treatment. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal
on a child's refusal of medical treatment have
clouded the issue and undermined the spirit of the
Gillick decision and the Children Act 1989. It is now
the case that a child patient whose competence is in
doubt will be found rational if he or she accepts the
proposal to treat but may be found incompetent ifhe
or she disagrees. Practitioners are alerted to the
anomalies now exhibited by the law on the issue of
children's consent and refusal. The impact of the
decisions from the perspectives of medicine, ethics,
and the law are examined. Practitioners should
review each case of child care carefully and in cases
ofdoubt seek legal advice.
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A 16 year old boy with diabetes lies in hospital refusing
the necessary treatment required to save his arm.
Septicaemia is likely to result, which might threaten
his life. Though the primary efforts will naturally be
targeted towards discussion with the young person
with the aim of overcoming all of the underlying issues
that seem to be preventing him from agreeing to what
most of us would regard as the reasonable approach,
what is the current state in law if the crisis worsens?
Would the refusal of a 16 year old person without
mental illness be binding on the professionals? Or
would the parents' agreement to treatment carry
greater weight?
Every case will have its own unique features, but in
this article we search for the presence of pointers and
themes in recent case law and provide a medicoethical
commentary on the present state of the law. We also
examine the implications ofthe cases for practitioners.
The Children Act 1989 came into force on 14
October 1991, bringing the law relating to children and
families into one piece of legislation.' In seeking to
redefine the balance between securing children's safety
and the responsibility and rights of parents to bring up
children within their own families, the act adopts as its
guiding principle the welfare ofthe child.
One aspect of the importance of the child's welfare is
the act's concern that children's wishes and feelings are
incorporated into decision making. Indeed, the act's
welfare checklist has as its first item "the ascertainable
wishes and feelings of the child considered in the light
of his age and understanding." The act has incor-
porated the Gillick principle that the child's full
consent to examination, assessment, or treatment is
required under the various protection, supervision,
and care orders ifhe or she is "of sufficient understand-
ing to make an informed decision."2 The guidance
accompanying the act states that "this is for the doctor
to decide,"3 but quite on what basis is not further
discussed.4 The act does not distinguish between
consenting to have a treatment on the one hand and
refusing consent on the other.
Since the act's inception, however, there have been
several important cases in the Court of Appeal, which,
while purporting to base themselves on the same
source as the Children Act-that is, the Gillick
decision'-have reached different conclusions on a
child's right to refuse treatment. Under the Children
Act a child has a statutory right to refuse treatment
proposed.' These Appeal Court cases hold that the
right to refuse treatment does not extend to those
children outside the Children Act. The purpose of this
article is to alert professionals to the anomalies that the
law now reveals.
The cases
The cases of Re R5 and Re W" concerned the
intersection of three pieces of law. The first of these
was the decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,2
briefly referred to earlier. The second was section 8 of
the Family Law Reform Act 1969, which provides that
the consent of a person aged 16 or 17 to medical
treatment "shall be as effective as if he were of full
age."9 The final area of law was the power of the court
in exercising its inherent (or wardship) jurisdiction.
Could the court in exercising this latter jurisdiction
override the wishes of a competent minor? Academics
have expressed conflicting views on the question. "01
CASE OF RE R
Re R concerned a 15 year old girl who had voluntarily
entered the care of the local authority after a fight with
her father.5 R had been known to social services for 12
years as a possible victim of emotional abuse. After
leaving care she absconded from her parents' home,
damaged property, threatened suicide, and attacked
her father. R was admitted to the psychiatric unit of a
hospital and then to a specialist adolescent care unit.
The unit sought to give her antipsychotic drugs. The
local authority initially gave permission for the admini-
stration but withdrew the consent on the basis that they
thought R was competent to express her own wishes on
the subject. The unit made it clear that it required
freedom to administer treatment without consent if
necessary, so the local authority started wardship
proceedings to resolve the matter.
In the Court of Appeal Lord Donaldson, Master of
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the Rolls, and Lord Justice Farquharson (Lord Justice
Staughton expressing no opinion) held that a child with
fluctuating mental capacity could never be said to be
competent even in her lucid moments. The court noted
that its wardship powers were broader than parental
powers. Wardship powers were theoretically unlimited
and were said certainly to extend to overriding the
wishes of a minor, whether "Gillick competent" or
not. The cases cited by the court as authority for this
view, however, were either decided before the Gillick
case or concerned wards whose views happened to
coincide with the court or related to wards who were
not regarded as being mature.
It was surprising that the court did not go along with
the spirit of the Gillick case and elect not to exercise
wardship powers in respect of competent minors. This
would have been permissible under the doctrine of Re
X (a minor) (wardship jurisdiction),'2 which holds that
the court may decline to exercise its wardship juris-
diction because of competing interests, notwithstand-
ing possible harm to the ward.'3
Lord Donaldson in Re R went one step further and
stated that, notwithstanding the dictum of Lord
Scarman in the Gillick case to the contrary, the right to
consent which a competent child had did not include
the right to veto treatment.' Treatment could proceed
on the consent of the parents or those in loco parentis.
Lord Donaldson noted that, although Lord Scarman
held that once a child became competent the parental
right to determine what treatment be given to the child
ended, the right to consent to treatment differed from
determining the treatment. Arguably though, the right
to determine includes the right to consent and is
not an alternative to it.
CASE OF REW
In Re W the young woman (aged 16) was suffering
from anorexia nervosa." The local authority in whose
care W was sought leave to have the court exercise its
inherent jurisdiction over the child. An order was
sought to permit compulsory feeding and movement of
W to another treatment centre. Through her legal
advisersW objected to both these proposals.
The Court of Appeal held that after Re RI it could
override the wishes of a minor, whether Gillick
-_-_
In Re R Lord Donaldson stated dtai a conmetent cld's nght to
consent did not include the right to veto treatment
competent or not. Lord Donaldson and Lord Justice
Balcombe held that the Family Law Reform Act,
though granting a 16 year old a right to consent, did not
also deprive the parents (or a local authority) of their
right to consent to medical treatment for their child. It
followed that a competent child could never veto
treatment if his or her parents had consented to it. The
court was not persuaded by the fact that in other orders
under the Children Act neither the court nor the
parents could override the expressed wishes of a
competent child to refuse assessment or treatment.
Only one member of the appeal court (Lord Justice
Nolan) was willing to hold that the welfare checklist
from section 1(3) of the Children Act should guide the
court's deliberations when exercising its inherent
jurisdiction.
All members of the Court of Appeal held that the
court's inherent jurisdiction had to be exercised in the
best interests of the child. As the child got older, the
court held, greater weight should be accorded to his or
her wishes. In this sense the court in Re W made a
concession to the Gillick principle.
We now comment on the court's rulings from the
perspective ofmedicine, ethics, and the law.
Discussion
The cases ofRe R and ReW adopt a different view of
the Gillick case from that found in the Children Act
generally. Some might argue that these cases merely
codify common sense, '4 but we think that they contra-
dict the spirit of the Children Act. In so doing they
implicitly set a higher "tariff" for refusing a medical
examination or procedure than for consenting to one.
A similar approach can be detected in the recent Court
of Appeal decision in Re T. In that case the court held
that a 20 year old's refusal of a blood transfusion was
not valid because she was misinformed about possible
substitutes for blood and did not foresee that her life
was in danger. If T had made the decision to accept
treatment on an equally misinformed basis, however,
perhaps her consent to treatment would not have been
called into question.
It seems obvious that a right to give consent must
also mean the right to refuse consent. Otherwise the
right to consent would seem to be no more than the
right to agree with the medical practitioner. Many
medical ethicists have commented wryly on the catch
22 by which patients whose competence is in doubt will
be found rational if they accept the doctor's proposal
but incompetent if they reject professional advice."-"8
Others argue that refusal oftreatment should trigger an
inquiry about the patient's competence, though not
necessarily a finding of incompetence.'9 As treatment is
perceived to be in the patient's best interests they argue
that we should impose a higher tariff for refusing than
consenting because refusing would seem to the ethicists
to be contrary to good sense. This assumes two
debatable points: that the doctor is right about what is
in the patient's best interests and that treating the
patient even without the patient's consent will still help
the patient. Although W accepted treatment after the
court's decision, overriding her autonomy might well
-have harmed her as her main desire for most ofthe case
seemed to have been to exert control. As was pointed
out by the court, control is the essence ofthe struggle in
cases of anorexia." Long term follow up studies of
people with anorexia are salutary reminders of the
lifelong struggles for control in a considerable minority,
which follow initial intervention in adolescence.2'
Hence there is at least room for debate concerning the
clinical decision to override a youngster's expressed
consent through such forcible means as a court of law.
Naturally, in some cases the court option will be the
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only one available without risking the life of the young
person, but in lesser cases there will be increasing room
for debate on this question.
In conclusion, practitioners are advised to proceed
cautiously in treating children and young people whose
consent is in doubt. Given the anomalies, seeking legal
advice may well be appropriate in difficult cases,
particularly when a young person withholds consent
and serious consequences, including death, may ensue
unless treatment is forthcoming. Individual cases may
need to be brought before the High Court so that the
option of lifesaving treatment can be debated in full.
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Tempting fate: control ofcommunicable disease in England
J Michael O'Brien, Sarah J O'Brien, AlasdairM Geddes, Bryan J Heap, Richard T Mayon-White
Recent changes in the NHS have left many defects
in the systems for the control of communicable
diseases and infection and their surveillance and the
management of outbreaks. Clear, explicit legislation
is needed, placing the responsibilities on health
authorities. New teams led by consultants need to be
set up to investigate and manage outbreaks of
communicable diseases ofall types.
"We have an unrivalled system in the UK" for dealing
with communicable diseases. So said Baroness Hooper
of our arrangements for early waming of outbreaks of
communicable disease in a speech to the Institute of
Health Service Managers in March 1991.1 We believe
that our unrivalled system is out of date and needs
substantial reforms.
The current surveillance system has three main
components. The first is notifications made by doctors
attending patients suspected of having certain specified
infectious diseases. Notifications are sent to the proper
officer of the local authority, who in tum informs the
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. This
system is notoriously inaccurate2; many doctors not
only do not know which diseases are notifiable but also
seem unaware of their statutory duty to notify.34 This
was one of the anxieties of the committee of inquiry
into the future development of the public health
function (the Acheson Committee) in 1988.5 The
current list of notifiable diseases is lamentably out of
date.6 Single cases of diseases which have emerged
recently as important problems in public health are not
notifiable in England, although, depending on the
judgment of individual proper officers about what
constitutes a serious outbreak, numbers of cases of
these diseases might be brought to the attention of the
chiefmedical officer.7
The second source of information is reports of
isolates from public health laboratories, hospital labora-
tories, and a small number of private laboratories.
These are collated by the Public Health Laboratory
Service/Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre
(PHLS/CDSC). The recognition of newly emerging
diseases like cryptosporidiosis and legionnaires'
disease depends on diagnosis in a laboratory but
reporting is voluntary. Concern (so far unsubstan-
tiated) has been expressed that the number of
specimens submitted to laboratories might fall with the
introduction of the internal market into the NHS, so
this important source of epidemiological data might be
severely compromised in future.
Thirdly, information about the incidence of com-
municable diseases is derived from the sentinel scheme
run by the Royal College of General Practitioners for
reporting disease in general practice. The main draw-
back of this scheme is that it is patchy.8 The best results
come from districts in which public health medical
staff have established local surveillance including the
use of "spotter" general practices.
There are, in addition, separate reporting systems
for sexually transmitted diseases,9 HIV, and AIDS,'0
and for new or rare diseases which appear periodically
and require the establishment of special surveillance
systems.
Two spectacular failures in the investigation and
control of outbreaks of communicable diseases in the
1980s at Stanley Royd and Stafford hospitals precipi-
tated the Acheson report, the most comprehensive
review of the public health system in England since
1871.
Public health in England: the Acheson report
The Acheson report made two very important
recommendations about the control of communicable
disease and infection. The first was that districts
should consider appointing full time consultants
responsible for communicable disease control who
would cover a sufficiently large population to develop
and maintain appropriate knowledge. This was com-
mended to authorities in official guidance."
The second recommendation was that the law
relating to infectious diseases should be revised "as a
matter of urgency" and the Department of Health
issued a consultation document in 1989,12 but sadly no
progress has been evident. A Department of Health
circular issued after the Acheson report raised expecta-
tions" but the responsibilities it suggested still lack any
statutory backing."I
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